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I. Introduction
As Gideon v. Wainwright1 nears the ripe old age of fifty, we
gathered at a conference at Washington and Lee University
School of Law to reflect upon the meaning of the contemporary
right to counsel. To my thinking, there is not one constitutional
right to counsel, but two. There is a right to legal counsel and a
right to extralegal counsel. The right to legal counsel applies
principally to the formal domain of the criminal trial; the right to
extralegal counsel applies exclusively to the comparatively
unstructured domains of the plea-bargain and guilty plea. I
acknowledge that the term extralegal is loaded and almost
certainly too strong. By extralegal, I do not intend to signify a
∗ Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law.
Thanks to Saverio Romeo for phenomenal research assistance.
1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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practice unrecognized by law. Rather, I mean the aspects of a
practice that are informed by influences beyond formal code law.2
I recall vividly my first week as a public defender in the
Bronx. I came to the job from a prestigious boutique white-collar
defense firm that had represented such high-profile clients as
Martha Stewart. I had done quite well at a top-ten law school and
had completed a prestigious clerkship. But I remained wholly
unprepared for practice in the Bronx criminal courts. No amount
of training in the science of law could have provided me with the
experiential wisdom required to master the art of local practice.
Instead, I had to live the practice (and not just the law) before I
could represent my clients effectively. The tired old adage holds
that a good lawyer knows the law; a great lawyer knows the
judge. The truth is not so simple. A great defense lawyer knows
not only the law and the judge, but also the prosecutor, the court
officers, the treatment providers, the social workers, the foreignlanguage interpreters, the corrections and probation officers, the
customs and norms of each and every courthouse subcommunity,
the going plea rate, the criminal and so-called collateral
consequences of conviction, the quickest path from one courtroom
to another, the courthouse elevators that are perennially slow or
broken, and, most of all, the client’s needs, objectives, and
sympathetic characteristics.3 Most of this wisdom accrues
independently of (or, at least, not entirely dependent upon) law.
2. Of course, some legal realists might counter that the term legal is
defined necessarily as the law in practice. Cf. Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic
Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 448 (1930) (“‘Real rules,’
then, if I had my way with words, would by legal scientists be called the
practices of the courts, and not ‘rules’ at all.”). I appreciate that perspective, but,
for present purposes, I bracket the question of what law does and does not
include. That is, I concede that my definition of extralegal entails a controversial
judgment about the nature of law, and I accept that, by some other measure, it
may be the wrong term. But, that caveat aside, I consider the term extralegal to
be sufficient—or, at least, sufficiently evocative.
Finally, I grant also that all practices of criminal law—including trial
practice—may be shaped by considerations beyond formal code law. My narrow
point is that the Court has seen fit to regulate constitutionally such
considerations only in the guilty-plea and plea-bargaining contexts.
3. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT 3–5 (1979)
(describing practice in lower criminal courts); MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA
BARGAINING 3–4 (1978) (same).
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That is, a great defense lawyer is more than just a legal
technician; she is a sociologist, a psychologist, and a humanist.
Of course, most facets of comprehensive defense practice are
not the appropriate purview of constitutional constraint. But,
until recently, the Supreme Court had turned an unhealthy blind
eye to the realities. In essence, the Constitution had utterly failed
to accommodate any and all practices beyond law. Most of defense
practice was left to the domain of professional ethics or was
unregulated altogether.4 Over the past five years, however, that
has begun to change. The Court has adopted the constitutional
perspective that it can no longer wholly sidestep messy practice
questions. Through a trio of landmark rulings—Padilla v.
Kentucky,5 Lafler v. Cooper,6 and Missouri v. Frye7—the Court
has reached the understanding that conventional criminal justice
primarily relies neither on trials nor even on law.8 To the
contrary, the criminal-justice system is—as the Court recognized
in Lafler—a system of pleas and plea-bargains.9 For a nation
committed to the due process ideal, this may constitute an
unfortunate reality, but it remains the reality nonetheless. More
to the point, the right to effective assistance of counsel would
4. See, e.g., NAT. LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES
CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION § 6.2 (1995) (“[C]ounsel should attempt
to become familiar with the practices and policies of the particular jurisdiction,
judge and prosecuting authority which may affect the content and likely results
of negotiated plea bargains.”).
5. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
6. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
7. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
8. See id. at 1407 (“The reality is that plea bargains have become so
central to the administration of the criminal justice system that defense counsel
have responsibilities in the plea bargain process, responsibilities that must be
met to render the adequate assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment
requires . . . .”); Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388 (“Ninety-seven percent of federal
convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty
pleas.”); Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 (“Pleas account for nearly 95% of all criminal
convictions.”); see also Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market:
From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1126 (2011)
(“[A] solid majority of the Court at last sees that plea bargaining is the norm;
sets the going rate; and needs consumer regulation and competent counsel to
make it intelligent, voluntary, and just.”).
9. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388 (“[C]riminal justice today is for the most
part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”).
FOR
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mean very little if these principal practices were walled off from
constitutional regulation.
Admittedly, the Court has long recognized that a defendant
has a right to effective assistance of counsel at a guilty plea (and
even with respect to the negotiations and discussions that led to
that guilty plea).10 But only now has the Court begun to recognize
that the right to effective assistance of counsel, itself, actually
means something different in the plea-bargaining context, and
that, accordingly, constitutional doctrine crafted to promote the
trial right to counsel is a poor fit for bargains and pleas. Simply,
plea practice responds to different questions. Trials are (and
ultimately should be) about guilt accuracy—that is, whether a
defendant is legally guilty. A good lawyer may smuggle equitable
considerations into her trial arguments to plant seeds of
nullification, but the bottom-line question remains relatively
scientific: Has the State demonstrated legal guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt? Comparatively, plea-bargains are (and
ultimately should be) about more than legal guilt. They are about
discretion. They are about fairness. They are—from the
prosecutor’s perspective—about efficiency and optimal crime
control. Such considerations invariably may overlap with legal
questions, but sometimes they may also run counter to it. Indeed,
often plea-bargaining provides a path out from under the
unwelcome strictures of legislative commands, like mandatoryminimum sentences and mandatory immigration and other socalled collateral consequences. In this way, plea-bargaining is a
tool to circumvent law.11
I remember a particular example from my own practice. My
client was charged with a violation—harassment in the second
degree. A conviction would not have given my client a criminal
record, but it potentially would have carried with it serious
immigration consequences. To get out from under those
consequences, I convinced the prosecutor to file a misdemeanor
charge of assault in the third degree and to let my client plead
10. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (applying a two-part test
applicable “to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of
counsel”).
11. Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J.
1969, 1975 (1992) (“Plea bargaining is to the sentencing guidelines as black
markets are to price controls.”).
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guilty to attempted reckless assault. The plea gave my client a
criminal record, but it left him in a comparatively better
immigration position.12 Here, then, was a defendant who
creatively pled up to a higher charge.
As the example demonstrates, plea-bargaining has more in
common with contracts than conventional criminal procedure.13 A
central contract law precept is that the parties may make their
own law.14 Likewise, prosecutors and defense attorneys use pleabargaining to “establish the law of the locale rather than apply
the law of the state.”15 It is said that “[t]he law of crime is

12. If memory serves, the defendant was better off for immigration
purposes with the criminal conviction because mens rea mattered to the
immigration inquiry, and the charge of harassment entailed a showing of actual
intent, whereas the charge of attempted reckless assault entailed a less culpable
mind state (and a fairly nonsensical one at that). Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 240.26 (McKinney 2013) (providing that a person is guilty of harassment in
the second degree when there is “intent to harass, annoy or alarm another
person”), with id. § 120.00(2) (providing that a person is guilty of assault in the
third degree when “[h]e recklessly causes physical injury to another person”).
There are myriad other (somewhat more troubling) examples of what Joseph
Colquitt has pejoratively termed “ad hoc plea bargaining.” See Joseph Colquitt,
Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TUL. L. REV. 695, 698–99 (2000) (disapproving of the
practice and providing that “[a]d hoc bargaining occurs when the parties suggest
unsanctioned punishments or benefits in settling criminal cases”); see also, e.g.,
Gina Barton, Mystery Resolved but Not Solved, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug.
24, 2006, at 1A (detailing defendant’s guilty plea to a reduced charge in
exchange for submission to a hysterectomy); Jules Wagman, Vasectomy Plea
Deal Represents Wacky Justice in Jacksonville, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 13,
1994, at A17 (describing defendants choice between injections of Depo-Provera
or a vasectomy as part of a plea deal); The Sentence is Church, and Defendant
Approves, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1994, at B18 (“[A] senior Federal judge here has
ordered a woman and her four children to attend church services each Sunday
for a year as part of a probation agreement in a drug case against her.”).
13. See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract,
101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1910 (1992) (“Properly understood, classical contract theory
supports the freedom to bargain over criminal punishment.”); see also, e.g.,
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (“[W]hen a plea rests in any
significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be
said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be
fulfilled.”).
14. See Harry W. Jones, The Jurisprudence of Contracts, 44 U. CIN. L. REV.
43, 50–54 (1975) (discussing the dispersion of power in private contract law).
15. Colquitt, supra note 12, at 698.
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special”16—that “crime belongs wholly to the law, and its
treatment is exhaustively based on considerations of legality.”17
Thus, the criminal justice system has rejected ostensibly soft—
and comparatively subjective—approaches to rulemaking, like
the common-law method of crime creation.18 Yet the criminal
justice system abides by the highly subjective art of making law
by agreement. Formal legality is, in this way, more aspiration (or
fiction) than reality. And, under prevailing criminal codes, it
could not be otherwise, because code law is often too hard and
disagreeable. In such circumstances, the stakeholders seek
outlets from code law, and plea-bargaining is the prevailing
outlet.
In fact, the Court has come not only to tolerate efforts to
bargain around code law; it has come to encourage them. The
Court has come to recognize prosecutors and defense attorneys as
the system’s real (and, in the Court’s view, appropriate) policy
makers. Thus, the Court has concluded that effective assistance
of bargaining counsel is and ought to be measured against their
conception of the “sound administration of criminal justice.”19 In
this way, the Court has constitutionally acknowledged a longapparent, practical rift between the distinct enterprises of trials
by jury and pleas by bargain: whereas the criminal trial is an
adjudicative and adversarial device designed to promote legal
16. Louis Michael Seidman, Points of Intersection: Discontinuities at the
Junction of Criminal Law and the Regulatory State, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
97, 97 (1996).
17. Egon Bittner, The Police on Skid-Row: A Study of Peace Keeping, 32
AM. SOCIOLOGICAL R. 699, 700 (1967); see also Kenneth I. Winston, On Treating
Like Cases Alike, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1, 37 (1974) (discussing criminal law’s long
tradition of “strict adherence to rules”). As Michael Seidman has observed,
“although realism’s lessons for criminal law seem obvious, formalism continues
to dominate criminal jurisprudence.” Seidman, supra note 16, at 103.
18. Conventionally, the legality principle is taken to require, at a
minimum, that legislators codify offenses ex ante, and that police and
prosecutors confine their collective attention to this “catalogue of what has
already been defined as criminal.” HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL SANCTION 88–90 (1968) (observing that the principle of legality is
unnecessary to minimize the prospect of arbitrariness and abuse).
19. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1387 (2012); see generally Josh
Bowers, Lafler, Frye, and the Subtle Art of Winning by Losing, 25 FED. SENT’G
REP. 40, 43 (2012) [hereinafter Bowers, Winning by Losing].

TWO RIGHTS TO COUNSEL

1139

accuracy (and, secondarily, to protect against coercion), the pleabargain is an administrative and collaborative device designed to
promote fairness and efficiency (and, secondarily, to protect
against deception and surprise).
In this Article, I explore this longstanding practical (and
emerging) jurisprudential rift between the meaning of effective
assistance of counsel at bargain and trial. In Part II, I describe
the Court’s methodological approach to plea-bargaining as
distinct from its approach to traditional pretrial and trial
procedures. Specifically, the Court has emphasized fair notice as
opposed to guilt accuracy. In Parts III and IV, I examine the
Court’s conventional methodological approach, which is
comparatively indifferent to unfairness and surprise and
comparatively more concerned with adversarial testing, guilt
accuracy, and prophylactics against coercion. In Part V, I discuss
the Court’s particular approach to coercion in the plea-bargaining
context. In Parts VI and VII, I focus narrowly on the extralegal
right to effective assistance of bargaining counsel in light of
recent Court rulings expanding the right. Specifically, I claim
that the Court has endorsed a richer conception of notice that
obliges defense attorneys to keep defendants apprised of practice
beyond law. And, even more than that, the Court may have also
obligated defense attorneys to bargain hard. Finally, I briefly
raise one of the most fascinating implications of the extralegal
right to counsel: that a defense attorney may now be compelled to
make extralegal arguments to the bargaining prosecutor that she
is forbidden to make to the trial jury—particularly, arguments
calculated to shortcut code law.
II. The Constitutional Significance of Surprise
In a separate essay, I argued that the Court has consistently
adopted a distinct methodological approach to plea-bargaining—
specifically, a methodology informed principally by contract
conceptions of fair notice and private ordering as opposed to
legalistic conceptions of guilt-accuracy of the kind that tend to
frame the rest of constitutional criminal procedure.20 That is, the
20. See Josh Bowers, Fundamental Fairness and the Path from Santobello
to Padilla: A Response to Professor Bibas, 2 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 52, 55 (2011)
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Court has taken legal accuracy to be somewhat irrelevant—
neither here nor there (or, rather, not here in the plea-bargaining
domain but there in traditional criminal procedure domains, like
charging and trials).21
I have defended the Court’s distinct methodological
approach.22 But it is not without shortcomings. Chiefly, it has led
the Court to dismiss—in unfounded and almost starry-eyed
terms—the prospect of legally erroneous plea convictions.23 But
the Court is not naïve. More likely, it recognizes—practically or
cynically—that the criminal justice system would grind to a halt
without well-oiled guilty-plea machinery (and a presumption of
guilt keeps that machinery well-oiled).24 Thus, the Court has
presumed that a pleading defendant is what he says he is—
guilty. Indeed, in North Carolina v. Alford,25 the Court even
presumed a defendant guilty, notwithstanding his equivocation:
[hereinafter Bowers, Fundamental Fairness] (“When it comes to contemporary
constitutional trial procedure, accuracy is the prevailing coin of the realm;
fundamental fairness is an afterthought . . . . [But] [i]n the plea-bargaining and
guilty-plea contexts, the accuracy principle has played a smaller role as
compared to fundamental fairness.”); see, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.
257, 261 (1971) (“Disposition of charges after plea discussions is . . . highly
desirable . . . for many reasons . . . . However, all of these considerations
presuppose fairness.”). As I previously discussed, cases like Santobello “can be
re-read as an effort to cement a set of national (and constitutional) contract
standards to promote fair and efficient bargaining between the guilty defendant
and his prosecutor.” Bowers, Fundamental Fairness, supra, at 67 n.35.
21. See Bowers, Fundamental Fairness, supra note 20, at 56 (“In the pleabargaining and guilty-plea contexts, the accuracy principle has played a smaller
role as compared to fundamental fairness.”); see also Bibas, supra note 8, at
1139 (observing that the Padilla Court’s focus “reaches beyond a defendant’s
factual guilt”).
22. See Bowers, Fundamental Fairness, supra note 20, at 67 (faulting “the
Court only for the inadequacy of its constitutional rules and standards, not also
for its dominant methodological approach”).
23. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970) (concluding
that it did not believe that “the encouragement of guilty pleas by offers of
leniency substantially increased the likelihood that defendants, advised by
competent counsel, would falsely condemn themselves”).
24. Cf. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260 (“‘[P]lea bargaining,’ is an essential
component of the administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be
encouraged.”).
25. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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“I’m not guilty but I plead guilty.”26 The irony, then, is that pleabargains and guilty pleas have very little to do—jurisprudentially
or practically—with guilt in the sense that legal guilt is never a
litigated or constitutional question. This is not to say that legal
guilt is wholly immaterial—just that the matter is settled already
by the underlying determination that there is probable cause for
the charges to which the defendant knowingly and voluntarily
pleads (or away from which he bargains).27
My immediate complaint, however, does not concern the
innocence problem. My complaint runs the other way: that, by
subjecting a prosecutor’s charging discretion to only a legalistic
probable cause check, the Court has done too little to promote the
substantive fairness of bargains and pleas. For example, in
Bordenkircher v. Hayes,28 the defendant rejected an offer of five
years in prison for forging an eighty-eight dollar check.29
Thereafter, the prosecutor carried out a threat to recharge the
defendant as a habitual offender subject to a mandatory
conviction sentence of life without parole—a sentence that the
defendant in fact received.30 It did not matter whether life
imprisonment was an appropriate punishment for smalltime
forgery.31 “The only question . . . was . . . formal legality.”32 Cases
like Bordenkircher reveal that, although plea-bargaining and
guilty-plea jurisprudence is animated by fairness, the Court
traditionally has endorsed only a cramped conception of
26. Id. at 28 n.2. The Alford Court observed: “Whether he realized or
disbelieved his guilt, he insisted on his plea because in his view he had
absolutely nothing to gain by a trial and much to gain by pleading.” Id. at 37
(emphasis added). Significantly, the Court never questioned his guilt or the
accuracy of the consequent conviction.
27. See Bibas, supra note 8, at 1133 (explaining that the Court has
“assumed . . . that innocent defendants are very unlikely to plead guilty”); see
also Bowers, Fundamental Fairness, supra note 20, at 58 (“[F]undamental
fairness is the focus because there is little else on which to concentrate once the
Court has deemed the accuracy question beside the point.”).
28. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
29. Id. at 358–59.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 361 (addressing the conduct of the prosecutor).
32. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
258 (2001) (“The fairness of the charge [in Bordenkircher] was irrelevant.”).
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fairness—that is, fair notice and fair dealing (procedural fairness)
more than fair deals (substantive fairness).33 Ultimately, then, a
prosecutor may exploit expansive substantive codes and
mandatory sentencing laws to compel pleas, as long as she does
so “forthrightly.”34
Moreover, the Court typically has required that the
defendant be made “fully aware” only of (i) the legal rights he
sacrifices by plea and (ii) the legal consequences of taking the
deal.35 In short, he has to comprehend only the generally
applicable law, not also the specific manner by which the law
applies to his case. That is, he does not need to know facts
external to his legal rights and charges—such as, evidentiary
facts about his chances of acquittal or practice facts about the
kinds of plea offers typically available in the local courthouse.36
But, as I examine in Part VI, the Court has come recently to
endorse a richer conception of what constitutes unfair surprise.37
III. The Constitutional Significance of Coercion
In any event, even a cramped conception of notice constitutes
a methodological approach distinct from conventional criminal
33. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (indicating that a
voluntary plea requires that a defendant is “fully aware” of the consequences of
pleading guilty); cf. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 13, at 1922 (arguing that a pleabargain should be invalidated on contract-law grounds if the risk of fraudulent
concealment is too great).
34. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (emphasizing
“forthright[] . . . dealings with the defense” to avoid the kind of “unhealthy
subterfuge that would drive the practice of plea bargaining back into the
shadows”).
35. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 755–56 (providing the due process test for what
the defendant must be made aware of in order to make an intelligent plea
decision); see also United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989) (“A plea of
guilty and the ensuing conviction comprehend all of the factual and legal
elements necessary to sustain a binding, final judgment of guilt and a lawful
sentence.”).
36. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (“[I]t is not sufficient
for the criminal defendant seeking to set aside . . . a plea to show that . . . h[e]
may not have correctly appraised . . . certain historical facts.”); see also Broce,
488 U.S. at 764 (quoting Tollett).
37. Infra Part VI.
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procedure doctrine. In traditional pretrial and trial contexts, the
Court has exhibited comparatively more concern about coercion
than unfair surprise, emphasizing repeatedly that coercive
tactics—like
coerced
confessions—are
constitutionally
problematic because they undermine guilt accuracy.38 The Court’s
conception of the trial right to counsel fits neatly within this
model. It is a prophylactic against coercion intended to promote
accurate adjudication thereby. That is, the trial right to counsel
provides a buffer against state-sanctioned force in much the same
way that other constitutional trial and pretrial protections serve
as buffers against state-sanctioned force.39 All of these rules and
standards—the right to trial counsel, the privilege against selfincrimination, the requirement that guilt be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, and rules and standards regulating the
admission and exclusion of evidence—are means of “testing the
prosecution” and its efforts to act against the liberty of the
defendant.40 And, in order to effectively test the prosecution, a
defendant requires the “guiding hand” of competent expert
counsel, schooled in the “science of law”:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if
it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even
38. See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 182 (1956)
The tendency of the innocent . . . to risk remote results of a false
confession rather than suffer immediate pain so strong that judges
long ago found it necessary to . . . treat any confession made
concurrently with torture or threat of brutality as too untrustworthy
to be received as evidence of guilt.
See also Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Of
course, no confession that has been obtained by any form of physical violence to
the person is reliable and hence no conviction should rest upon one obtained in
that manner.”); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285–86 (1936) (finding a
denial of due process when a confession was obtained by coercion).
39. Cf. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986) (observing that
unconstitutional confession cases “all . . . contained a substantial element of
coercive police conduct . . . [and] the integral element of police overreaching”).
40. John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047, 1048–49 (1994). These
procedural rules and standards are not just animated by the same logic. They
grew up together in the eighteenth century. Id. at 1048. More to the point,
Langbein has argued that the right to counsel is an adjunct to or source of all of
these other rights. Id.
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the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes
no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is
incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the
indictment is good or bad. . . . He requires the guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without
it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction
because he does not know how to establish his innocence.41

It is only after a defendant is duly convicted—
notwithstanding the efforts of competent counsel—that coercion
becomes something other than an arbitrary exercise of force: it
becomes a probabilistically accurate exercise of legal justice. As
my colleague, Anne Coughlin, once remarked: “The absence of
due process is experienced as the presence of force.”42 A good trial
lawyer is a guarantor of due process, precisely because she
possesses the technical tools to put legal charges to the test. She
uses law to oppose legal efforts to use force. The touchstone is
technical legal wisdom—the wisdom to navigate law; to find, in
the words of the Court, “simple, orderly, and necessary” that
which appears to the untrained layman “intricate, complex and
mysterious.”43
IV. Deception and Conventional Criminal Practice
The Court is relatively indifferent to notice, as compared to
coercion, in the conventional constitutional criminal procedure
contexts. To the extent notice is relevant, it is only as a
mechanism to promote accurate adjudication by minimizing
confusion over the law’s meaning and reach. Consider, for
41. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932); see Michael J. Klarman,
Scottsboro, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 379, 397 (2009) (discussing Powell as an accuracyoriented decision). Anecdotally, the Gideon case itself offers a vivid illustration
of the critical importance of counsel to an accurate disposition: on retrial, the
jury took just one hour to acquit the defendant. See A.B.A., 50th Anniversary of
Gideon v. Wainwright (2012), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/project
_press/2012/year-end/gideon_50.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (“Mr. Gideon
was acquitted after only an hour of jury deliberation.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
42. Katherine Calos, ‘Rally for Honor’ at U.Va.: Pride, Optimism Reign;
Lawn Ralliers Hope Pressure Will Force Board to ‘Right the Wrong,’ Reinstate
Sullivan, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, June 25, 2012, at A-01 (quoting Coughlin).
43. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
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instance, the one type of deception that the Court consistently
has forbidden: state actors are not permitted to make false claims
of legal authority. Thus, a police officer cannot order a suspect to
submit to a search or seizure that the suspect has a legal right to
refuse,44 and a prosecutor cannot improperly comment on the
import of the defendant’s exercise of his constitutional rights.45
These ploys and misstatements are impermissible precisely
because they run the risk of reshaping the meaning and reach of
law and thereby undermining its accurate administration.
By contrast, the Court generally has tolerated efforts to hide
the relevant facts from suspects and defendants. A police officer
may conceal his identity to gain access to a suspect’s home or to
extract his confession, and a prosecutor typically may spring trial
surprises and conceal evidence.46 Here, deception and subterfuge
are permissible because the defendant is not fooled about the law
but only about the facts. Law and its accurate application are left
unaffected. Consider, for instance, Moran v. Burbine.47 In Moran,
the Court held incriminating statements admissible when the
police failed to inform a suspect that his attorney had called the
precinct and had attempted to invoke his privilege against selfincrimination and his attendant Miranda48 right to counsel.49
44. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968) (holding
invalid a consent to search when officers falsely claimed they possessed a
warrant); see also Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862 (2011) (holding that
officers may create exigent circumstances by knocking loudly on an apartment
door as long as they “do not gain entry to premises by means of an actual or
threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment”).
45. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179–82 (1986) (discussing
improper comments made by the prosecutor).
46. See White v. United States, 401 U.S. 745, 745 (1971) (holding that
police may record surreptitiously conversations between informants and
suspects without implicating the Fourth Amendment); see also Illinois v.
Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990) (“Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic
deception by taking advantage of a suspect’s misplaced trust in one he supposes
to be a fellow prisoner.”); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966)
(holding that police may go undercover without implicating the Fourth
Amendment). As is probably familiar to anyone who watches police-procedural
television programs, interrogating officers are free to lie about, for example, the
strength of the State’s evidence or the cooperation of a confederate.
47. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
48. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
49. See Moran, 475 U.S. at 434 (holding that “the Court of Appeals erred in
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According to the Court, the interrogation was constitutional
because the police had provided the suspect his Miranda
warnings, and the suspect had waived his rights and agreed to
speak.50 In short, the Court concluded that the defendant was
entitled constitutionally to understand that he had a legal right
to counsel but not that he had a lawyer in fact. (In any event,
Miranda is the only conventional criminal procedure context in
which the Court has even obliged state actors to make suspects
and defendants affirmatively aware of their legal rights.)51
And notice what else the Court has deemphasized.
Procedural fairness is no central part of the inquiry. That is, the
Court has refused to consider whether gamesmanship of the kind
found in Moran is unfair according to some ontic measure,
because the officers’ efforts to play with the facts did not impede
(and may well have promoted) legally accurate adjudication. In
this vein, even the ostensible exceptions prove the rule.
Specifically, a prosecutor cannot affirmatively manipulate or
misstate the evidence.52 Additionally, she has an affirmative duty
finding that the Federal Constitution required the exclusion of the three
inculpatory statements”). Indeed, the Court deemed irrelevant the fact that
police had falsely assured defense counsel that the suspect would not be
interrogated. Id. at 419.
50. See id. at 421 (finding that the defendant validly waived his Miranda
rights).
51. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469 (providing that “[t]he warning to remain
silent must be accompanied by the explanation . . . [and] is needed to order to
make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of
forgoing it”). Repeatedly, the Court has refused to extend Miranda-type
affirmative warnings to other contexts. For instance, police need not warn
defendants of their right to refuse to comply with drug interdiction efforts or
with a request for consent to search. See United States v. Drayton, 535 U.S. 194,
194 (2002) (holding that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require police
officers to advise bus passengers of their right not to cooperate and refuse to
consent to searches”); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248
(1973) (holding that “when the subject of a search is not in custody and the State
attempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in
fact voluntarily given”).
52. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (providing that “it
is not enough that the prosecutors’ remarks were undesirable or even
universally condemned” but that instead “[t]he relevant question is whether the
prosecutors’ comments so infected the trial with unfairness to make the
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to disclose to the defendant material exculpatory and
impeachment evidence.53 On both scores, a contrary rule would
undermine guilt accuracy.54
V. Coercion and Plea-Bargaining Practice
In the bargaining context, the Court has not only done more
to promote affirmative notice, it has proven more willing to
tolerate coercion. Indeed, one legal historian has even cheekily
equated the modern practice to the medieval practice of
torture55—a provocative bit of hyperbole, no doubt, but one that
underscores the intense pressure to bargain that the Court has
both authorized and encouraged.56 To be fair, I recognize that the
Court has seen fit to forbid plea-bargaining pressure that
amounts to “actual or threatened physical harm” or “mental
coercion overbearing the will of the defendant.”57 However, it has
held expressly that the kind of mental coercion implicit to a
charge—even to a capital charge or mandatory charge of life
without parole—does not qualify as mental coercion.58 As long as
conviction a denial of due process”).
53. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that “the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecution”); see also
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 667 (1985) (holding “that evidence
withheld by government is ‘material,’ as would require reversal of conviction,
only if there is reasonable probability that, had evidence been disclosed to
defense, result of proceeding would have been different”).
54. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (providing when suppression of evidence
violates due process); see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972)
(“[The] deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of known
false evidence is incompatible with ‘rudimentary demands of justice.’”).
55. See John H. Langbein, Plea Bargaining and Torture, 46 U. CHI. L. REV.
3, 13 (1978) (“Plea bargaining, like torture, is coercive.”).
56. Supra note 20 and accompanying text (referencing Santobello).
57. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970).
58. See id. at 755 (“[A] plea of guilty is not invalid merely because entered
to avoid the possibility of a death penalty.”); see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (holding “that the course of conduct engaged in by the
prosecutor . . . which no more than openly presented the defendant with the
unpleasant alternatives of forgoing trial or facing charges on which he was
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any such charge is legally supportable, the attendant pressure
amounts to no more than legal justice in action.59 At that point,
the only relevant inquiry is notice. Thus, in Bordenkircher, the
threatened habitual offender charge was deemed to be
constitutional, because the prosecutor had made his intention to
add the count clear “at the outset of the plea negotiations.”60
Likewise, in Mabry v. Johnson,61 the defendant’s plea conviction
was deemed to be constitutional because the Court found that it
was “in no sense the product of governmental deception.”62
Particularly, the Mabry Court had concluded that “[r]espondent
was fully aware of the likely consequences when he pleaded
guilty,” and, thus, it was “not unfair to expect him to live with
those consequences now.”63
Simply, the Court has taken the position that the pressure to
bargain away from a cognizable charge is nothing more than an
“inherent” and acceptable part of the process.64 “[F]orce, threats,
or promises” are legally significant only when they are “other
than promises in a plea agreement.”65 In this way pleabargaining is self-actualizing. Consider, for instance, the
defendant’s involuntariness claim in Brady v. United States,66
which was the Supreme Court’s initial decision holding
constitutional the practice of plea-bargaining.67 The defendant
plainly subject to prosecution, did not violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment”).
59. Cf. Langbein, supra note 55, at 13 n.24 (“Coercion authorized by law is
different from coercion meant to overcome the guarantees of law.”).
60. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 360.
61. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984).
62. Id. at 510.
63. Id. at 511.
64. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970) (discussing that
the pressure to bargain for a plea deal is often advantageous to both the
defendant and to the prosecution).
65. United States v. Frook, 616 F.3d 773, 777 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting FED.
R. CRIM. P. 11(b)).
66. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
67. See id. at 758 (“[C]ourts will satisfy themselves that pleas of guilty are
voluntarily and intelligently made by competent defendants with adequate
advice of counsel that there is nothing to question the accuracy and reliability of
the defendants’ admissions that they committed crimes with which they are
charged.”).

TWO RIGHTS TO COUNSEL

1149

faced a capital charge and argued, in essence, that he was scared
to death (or to plea) by the prospect of trial conviction and
consequent sentence.68 The defendant took the prosecutor’s
message to be: “If you don’t plead, we may kill you.”69 Yet, the
Court rejected the claim that such a convincing message was
coercive, concluding simply that there was no evidence that the
defendant was “so gripped by the fear of death” that he could not
rationally weigh the advantages of pleading guilty.70 Or, rather,
the Court dismissed the claim precisely because the prosecutor’s
message was so clear. All that mattered was that the charge was
valid and that the defendant had his eyes open to it. This is a
perspective that sounds squarely in contract theory. Consider the
following Commentary to the Uniform Commercial Code: “The
principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair
surprise . . . and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because
of superior bargaining power.”71 In other words, one party’s
superior ability to turn the bargaining screws is of far less
significance than the other party’s ability (or inability) to
recognize that fact.
In Brady, the risk of coercion was of little importance
because legal guilt was not an open question. That is, the Court
considered the question of legal guilt foreclosed by the
defendant’s willingness to plead guilty to a legally supported
charge. And according to this logic, there is no need to protect
against coercion once there is no prosecution case to test.
VI. The Implications of the Changing Face of Bargaining Surprise
To summarize, because conventional constitutional criminal
procedure cares comparatively less about autonomy and fairness,
and comparatively more about technical guilt accuracy, it puts a
68. See id. at 746 (arguing that a guilty plea is invalid “when the fear of
death is shown to have been a factor in the plea”).
69. Cf. Langbein, supra note 55, at 15 (“The tortured confession is, of
course, markedly less reliable than the negotiated plea, because the degree of
coercion is greater. . . . But the resulting moral quandary is the same.”); Scott &
Stuntz, supra note 13, at 1920 (describing as coercive a prosecutor’s “strategic
manipulation” of trial and bargaining sentencing differentials).
70. Brady, 397 U.S. at 750 (1970).
71. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2004).
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premium on protecting against coercion; because constitutional
bargaining and guilty plea procedure cares comparatively more
about autonomy and fairness, and comparatively less about the
perceived settled question of technical guilt accuracy, it puts a
premium on promoting informed choice. Implicit in the notion of
the conventional adversarial system is the notion of conflict—of
force and the resistance to it.72 Implicit in private ordering—in
contract and compromise—is the notion of fair notice and dealing.
Again, this is not to say that an adversarial system is wholly
unconcerned with notice or that a cooperative system is wholly
unconcerned with coercion. Just that one system will prioritize
one value and the other system will prioritize the other. Thus, for
instance, the term “voluntariness” has a radically different
meaning in contexts of confessions and plea-bargains. For
confessions, voluntariness serves to protect against crushing
pressure; for plea-bargains, voluntariness serves to guarantee
informed choice.73
Looking narrowly at the right to counsel, defense lawyers are
“necessities, not luxuries” in all critical stages of the criminal
process, but for different reasons.74 The trial—or legal—right to
counsel is “implicit in the concept of an ordered liberty” (and
therefore constitutionally required) because it forecloses coercion
and promotes legally accurate adjudication,75 whereas the
72. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic
Separation in Criminal Law, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 11 (Paul H.
Robinson, Stephen P. Garvey & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan eds., 2009) (describing
the “criminal law’s coerciveness” as “a dog of such ferocity” and as a “euphemism
for intimidation, brutality, and violence”). These buffers are necessary because,
according to Dan-Cohen: “[T]o be ruled also means to be subject to various forms
of violence and brutality.” Id. at 28.
73. Compare Brady, 397 U.S. at 749 (distinguishing the contexts of
confessions from bargains and pleas), with Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532,
542 (1897) (“[W]herever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent
because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by that portion of the fifth
amendment to the constitution . . . that no person ‘shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.’”).
74. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
75. Id.; see also HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION
172 (1968) (“If the process is seen as a series of occasions for checking its own
operation, the role of counsel is a much more nearly central one . . . . The reason
for this is to be found in the assumption . . . that the process is an adversary
one.”).
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bargaining—or extralegal—right to counsel is “implicit in the
concept of an ordered liberty” because it forecloses surprise and
promotes fair administration.76 Bargaining counsel serves less as
a buffer against state power and more as a lens to draw the
state’s power into sharp focus. Specifically, the defense attorney
ensures that the bargain is struck and the plea is executed with
sufficient transparency because a lack of adequate notice may
keep her client from appreciating the kind of plea-bargaining
pressure that the Court has taken to be part and parcel of the
lawful “give and take.”77 Some notion of coercion may still be
significant, but, by the Court’s reasoning, there is no
impermissible coercion to a charge that is supported by probable
cause.78 For the Court, it matters terrifically that prosecutors
apply pressure with the law, not with their hands.
It is my position that, in both conventional and bargaining
contexts, the Court has paid insufficient attention to one
constitutional value or the other. But, for present purposes, I am
concerned with plea-bargaining only. I do not believe that it is
misguided to adopt a distinct methodological approach in the
bargaining context. The Court is right to conclude that pleas and
trials are dissimilar enterprises that demand dissimilar
treatment. But dissimilar treatment need not translate to
disregard for the secondary value. The Court has failed to grasp
this even in its recent plea-bargaining decisions. However, the
Court has expanded the constitutional scope of fair notice, and, in
its own way, that fresh conception may have also served to soften
the harshest aspects of coercive contemporary plea practice. The
Court first introduced this fresh conception in Padilla v. Kentucky
when it approved of “creative” bargaining to circumvent
mandatory sentencing and so-called collateral consequences that

76. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342.
77. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978).
78. Thus, a bargaining prosecutor may keep badgering a defendant to
accept a plea offer without undercutting the voluntariness of a consequent
knowing and intelligent guilty plea. Comparatively, a police officer can ask for
consent to search only so many times before submission is construed as
involuntary, a suspect need invoke his Miranda rights only once to cut off
custodial interrogation, and a trial prosecutor can only address a question to a
testifying defendant once before it is asked and answered.
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may prove disproportionate or inefficient in application.79 Again
in Lafler and in Frye, the Court endorsed bargaining as a
permissible mechanism to circumvent law. But the Court went
further still. It extended the constitutional guarantee of effective
assistance of counsel to rejected plea offers.80
This is a significant development for two underappreciated
reasons. First, as Justice Scalia revealed in a pair of
characteristically scathing dissents, the Court could not have
made this move without concurrently recognizing a constitutional
entitlement to plead guilty.81 As Justice Scalia suggested, it is a
practical tautology that counsel can only unconstitutionally fail to
exercise duties that she is constitutionally obliged to perform.82
And, critically, the Court had never held previously that
bargaining constituted such a duty. To the contrary, the Court
had repeatedly declared (in sum and substance) that “there is no
constitutional right to plea bargain,”83 and that the plea-bargain
is, accordingly, of no constitutional import:
79. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (discussing the ability
of the parties to bargain “creatively” to avoid mandatory deportation); see also
Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479, 1492 n.10 (2012) (“Armed with the
knowledge that a guilty plea would preclude travel abroad, aliens like Vartelas
might endeavor to negotiate a plea to a nonexcludable offense . . . .”).
80. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012) (applying
“Strickland’s prejudice test where ineffective assistance results in a rejection of
the plea offer and the defendant is convicted at the ensuing trial”); Missouri v.
Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1409 (2012) (providing that “[t]o show prejudice from
ineffective counsel where a plea offer has lapsed or been rejected because of
counsel’s deficient performance, defendants must demonstrate a reasonable
probability they would have accepted the earlier plea offer had they been
afforded effective assistance of counsel”).
81. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1395 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (questioning the
majority’s holding in light of the preexisting well-established rule that a
defendant has no entitlement to a plea-bargain). However, just because the
Court may have now recognized a constitutional entitlement to bargain it does
not follow that the defendant has a right to be offered a plea. See id. at 1387
(majority opinion) (“[A] defendant has no right to be offered a plea . . . . If a plea
bargain has been offered, a defendant has the right to effective assistance of
counsel in considering whether to accept it.”); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S.
545, 561 (1977) (“[T]he prosecutor need not [plea-bargain] if he prefers to go to
trial.”).
82. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 561.
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A plea bargain standing alone is without constitutional
significance; in itself it is a mere executory agreement, which
until embodied in the judgment of a court, does not deprive an
accused of liberty or any other constitutionally protected
interest.84

This is not to say that the Court had left plea negotiations
wholly unregulated. Because due process requires that the
ultimate plea be knowing and voluntary, the Court had long
recognized that the defendant enjoys a right to counsel with
respect not only to the plea proceeding, but also to the
negotiations and discussions that led to it.85 In Lafler and Frye,
however, the Court applied the right to counsel to plea
negotiations and discussions even in the absence of a plea.86
Justice Scalia saw this as an unprecedented expansion of the
right to counsel. For him, “bad plea bargaining has nothing to do
with ineffective assistance of counsel in the constitutional sense”
because a defendant has no right to plea-bargain in the first
instance.87 All that may be said is that the defendant was “denied
a right the law simply does not recognize.”88 And, descriptively,
Justice Scalia is right. The Court had to have determined that
the “bargain standing alone” has some constitutional significance
after all:89
[T]he Court today opens a whole new field of constitutionalized
criminal procedure: plea-bargaining law. . . . The Court has
never held that [constitutional regulation] extends to all
84. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507 (1984) (“It is [only] the ensuing
guilty plea that implicates the Constitution.”).
85. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 54 (1985) (recognizing a right to
effective assistance of counsel at negotiations that lead to guilty pleas); Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (noting that guilty pleas “not only must
be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences”).
86. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012) (stating that “the
performance of respondent’s counsel was deficient when he advised respondent
to reject the plea offer”); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1406 (2012) (“The
challenge is not to the advice pertaining to the plea that was accepted but rather
to the course of legal representation that preceded it with respect to other
potential pleas and plea offers.”).
87. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1393 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 1395.
89. Mabry, 467 U.S. at 507.
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aspects of plea negotiations, requiring not just advice of
competent counsel before the defendant accepts a plea bargain
and pleads guilty, but also the advice of competent counsel
before the defendant rejects a plea bargain and stands on his
constitutional right to a fair trial. The latter is a vast
departure from our past cases, protecting . . . a judicially
invented right to effective plea bargaining. . . . Today, . . . the
Supreme Court of the United States elevates plea bargaining
from a necessary evil to a constitutional entitlement.90

Second, Lafler and Frye are significant decisions for what
they say about the Court’s perspective on plea-bargaining and the
place the practice occupies in the criminal justice system.
Specifically, the Court signaled that a plea-bargain is the
expected mode of disposition, announcing that “it is not some
adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice
system.”91 Simply, a bargain is more than just consistent with
law; it is law.92 As I have argued elsewhere, this amounts to an
unconventional, expansive, and even dubious conception of what
law is. According to this perspective, law is only that which
prosecutors and defense attorneys do—whether what they do
reflects or, conversely, deviates from the dictates of code law.93
This is a conception of law as practice—or “practice law,” as I
90. Id. at 1391–97 (discussing “counsel’s plea-bargaining skills, which must
now meet a constitutional minimum”). Jenny Roberts, one of the contributors to
this volume, has expressed a similar view. See Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea
Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 10)
(“Surely, if the Court meant to limit the right to effective assistance to informing
and counseling defendants about formal plea offers . . . it would not have
repeatedly used the words ‘plea-bargaining,’ ‘plea negotiations,’ and ‘negotiation
of a plea bargain.’ . . . . [I]t logically follows that there is a right to effective
bargaining counsel.”) (manuscript on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
91. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (quoting Scott & Stuntz, supra note 13, at
1912); see also id. (describing plea-bargains as “so central to the administration
of the criminal justice system . . . [that] the negotiation of a plea bargain, rather
than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical point for a
defendant”).
92. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1387 (2012) (concluding that pleabargaining is not “outside the law”).
93. See Bowers, Winning by Losing, supra note 19, at 127 (“[T]he legislator
is subservient to the prosecutor because the prosecutor largely controls the plea
bargaining regime.”).
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termed it.94 And, in this way, I share Justice Scalia’s skepticism.95
According to Justice Scalia, “the law is the law” and pleabargaining is “incompatible” with it (even if it is practically
inevitable).96
But, though Justice Scalia may have the better end of the
argument descriptively, I do not agree that plea-bargaining—by
virtue of its extralegal status—ought also to fall beyond
constitutional regulation.97 To the contrary, the Court’s decisions
reflect a welcome recognition that—whether plea-bargaining is
deemed law or, more accurately, practice—it remains at least as
“intricate, complex and mysterious”98 as trial, and, thus, it
demands constitutional regulation.99 Indeed, bargaining may be
even more complex and mysterious, because it entails wisdom
and craft that transcend law. Thus, the defense lawyer must
understand not only the formal substantive and procedural legal
rules and standards (and the manner by which these rules and
standards intersect with facts), but also the local practice (and
the manner by which that practice intersects—or fails to
intersect—with law and facts).
Simply, competent plea-bargaining and trial advocacy
require a lawyer to rely upon distinct skill sets. First and
foremost, effective assistance of counsel at trial demands a sound
understanding of the science of law, whereas effective assistance
of counsel at bargain demands a sound understanding of the art
94. Id.
95. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Missouri v.
Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1412–14 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1397 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he law is the
law, and those who break it should pay the penalty provided. . . . Today,
however, the Supreme Court of the United States elevates plea bargaining from
a necessary evil to a constitutional entitlement.”); see also id. (“[W]e accept plea
bargaining because many believe that without it our long and expensive process
of criminal trial could not sustain the burden imposed on it, and our system of
criminal justice would grind to a halt.”).
97. See Bowers, Winning by Losing, supra note 19, at 129 (“[P]lea
bargaining may provide an extralegal outlet. But it does not translate that the
practice—as the dominant mode of criminal case disposition—is thereby
unworthy of constitutional oversight.”).
98. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
99. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408 (“The art of negotiation is at least as nuanced
as the art of trial advocacy.”).
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of extralegal persuasion. Of course, trial advocacy is not pure
science. To the contrary, a brilliant cross-examination or closing
argument
involves
a
nontechnical
(and
sometimes
improvisational) element of performance art.100 Nevertheless, the
bottom-line trial question remains a technical question: whether
the admissible evidence is sufficient to prove legal guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. By contrast, the bottom-line bargaining
question is informed by the technical legal question only partially
(and sometimes not much at all). That is, although bargaining is
shaped by the shadow of substantive law, it is shaped also (and
often
principally)
by
normative
considerations
(like
blameworthiness and fair sentence), practical considerations (like
extant resource constraints), and political considerations (like
public safety, crime control, and social control).101 In short, it is
shaped not only by what the law is, but also by what legal
professionals do with law in practice—what professionals make of
the law.
Even an optimal substantive criminal code will only
sometimes reflect and express the (somewhat conflicting)
considerations that inform plea-bargaining. Ultimately, it is an
empirical question just how often the practice of plea-bargaining
traces the shadow of substantive law or, comparatively, how often
it blurs or obscures law altogether. In any event, because some
degree of mismatch is endemic, the practice of plea-bargaining is
inevitably extralegal to some (probably not insignificant)
degree.102 Particularly in the context of enforcement of petty
crimes and mandatory sentencing laws, the lawyer’s bargaining
100. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 681, 693 (1984)
(“[A]dvocacy is an art and not a science . . . . [A]n act or omission that is
unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in another.”).
101. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of
Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and
Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004).
102. Colquitt, supra note 12, at 699 (“When the parties reach ad hoc
settlements, they act outside the law.”); Langbein, supra note 55, at 16–17
(“When people who have murdered are said to be convicted of wounding . . .
[t]his willful mislabelling plays havoc with . . . the moral force of the criminal
law.”); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55
STAN. L. REV. 29, 38 (2002) (“[T]he compromise outcome allows the prosecutor to
respond to the ‘equities’ in particular cases.”).
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arguments often become less legal and more normative or policydriven. That is, the defense attorney may direct her efforts not to
the question of whether the substantive law technically applies,
but rather why it should not be applied in this case. In such
circumstances,
plea-bargaining
reshuffles
conventional
adversarial roles (and distorts conventional institutional
architecture), by pitting collaborative prosecutors and defense
attorneys against legislative prescription and command.
If nothing else, almost all plea-bargains demand that the
prosecutor disregard a measure of legal guilt in exchange for the
defendant’s acceptance of some of it. And, by that nature, pleabargaining describes an extralegal project—at least as compared
to trial advocacy. Moreover, the art of practice is not just
somewhat extralegal, it is decidedly local—a kind of localism that
was once exercised by juries, but that is now the province of
professional lawyers.103
Until recently, the Court had failed to accommodate these
practice realities. As indicated, it constitutionally required that
the defendant plead guilty with only his legal eye open—that is,
with awareness of his legal rights and the legal consequences of
the plea.104 A pleading defendant did not need to also understand
legal facts about the merits or existence of available defenses,
much less practice facts about the quality of his plea as measured
against the prevailing norms and customs of the local courthouse.
That has now changed (albeit to a somewhat uncertain degree).
After Lafler and Frye, a defense attorney apparently must do
more than merely provide legal notice of pending and prospective
charges, trial rights, and bargaining consequences. A defense
attorney also must provide at least some notice in some
circumstances of opportunities to circumvent pending and
prospective charges.
The question remains open, however, of what notice under
which circumstances. Ultimately, Lafler and Frye are as
103. See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency & Participation in Criminal
Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 912–14 (2005) (describing the shift from lay
and local participation to professionalized criminal justice); William J. Stuntz,
Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1973–74 (2008) (same); see also
Colquitt, supra note 12, at 698 (describing plea-bargaining as local law).
104. See supra notes 3–12 and accompanying text.
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noteworthy for what they leave unsaid as what they said. That is,
neither case reached both prongs of the constitutional
ineffectiveness test, which are deficient performance and
consequent prejudice. In Frye, the Court held that a defense
attorney’s wholesale failure to inform her client of a formal offer
constitutes categorically deficient performance, but the Court
remanded for a prejudice determination.105 In Lafler, the Court
addressed prejudice, but the State conceded deficient
performance in circumstances where the attorney advised the
defendant to reject a plea based upon the profoundly erroneous
advice that no jury would convict the defendant of attempted
murder for shooting the victim only in the extremities.106
Between the two decisions, Lafler potentially breaks much
more ground. Frye would seem to stand only for the hard rule
that defense counsel must relay all formal offers to clients. In
Lafler, the Court also suggested that defense counsel must advise
clients of the appropriate course and perhaps even persuade
clients to accept manifestly favorable offers.107 And the measure
of whether a particular offer is manifestly favorable is not a
purely (or even principally) legalistic determination; it is a
probabilistic evaluation. Indeed, it is sometimes even an
extralegal evaluation to the extent that the decision is informed
by equitable, practical, or instrumental considerations beyond
law. Necessarily, such an approach entails richer conceptions of
notice and fairness—conceptions intended to help clients
appreciate all of their options and all of the implications of
accepting or foregoing bargains. Such an approach demands that
counsel give clients the benefit of learned courthouse wisdom.
Of course, a close reader of the cases can discern only so
much from decisions that have each left undiscussed one half of
the constitutional test. Keeping to Lafler, however, the reader
may conclude fairly that the Court could not have intended to
reform radically constitutional prejudice but not also
performance.108 And the Court did radically reform constitutional
105. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1403 (2012).
106. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1383, 1386 (2012).
107. See infra Part VII.
108. See Bowers, Winning by Losing, supra note 19, at 127–28 (“[I]t is hard
to imagine that the Court intended to reorient the focus of only the prejudice
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prejudice. Previously, the Court had held that to demonstrate
bargaining prejudice, the defendant had to show a reasonable
probability that he would have prevailed at trial.109 In this way,
the Court had pegged effective bargaining to trial practice and its
emphasis on guilt accuracy.110 However, in Lafler, the Court
acknowledged that a defendant may also be prejudiced if he
“lose[s] benefits he would have received in the ordinary course”—
that is, if he ends up with an atypically bad bargain.111 Here, the
measure of what the defendant “would have received in the
ordinary course” depends upon some evaluation of local practice,
which, in turn, may operate independently of (or even counter to)
code law. And, notably, the Court cautioned that when a lawyer
fails to bargain effectively and the case proceeds to trial, the
prong and not also the performance prong of the ineffectiveness test.”).
109. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
110. Id. Previously, I argued:
[T]he Hill standard is designed to recognize only a certain kind of
prejudice—that is, prejudice sufficient to impact the “binary” decision
to plead guilty or go to trial. . . . [T]he Court announced a prejudice
standard that is unconcerned with the fairness of the deal, and is
instead concerned only with the accuracy of the guilt
determination. . . . For many defendants, it is the substance of the
plea deal that matters much more than the accuracy of the
underlying conviction. . . . In this way, the Hill Court evaluated the
guilty plea not on its own terms but against the yardstick of trial
accuracy.
Bowers, Fundamental Fairness, supra note 20, at 111–13; see also Jenny
Roberts, Proving Prejudice, Post-Padilla, 54 HOWARD L.J. 693, 696 (2011)
(criticizing Hill because it “assumes that rejection of a guilty plea has only one
outcome—trial”); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 13, at 1931 (“The potential
unfairness in the typical plea bargain is not that the defendant gives up some
legal entitlements, but that he may not get enough from the government in
return.”).
111. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388 (emphasis added); see also RONALD J. ALLEN,
WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, JOSEPH L. HOFFMAN, DEBRA A. LIVINGSTON & ANDREW D.
LEIPOLD, COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: SUPPLEMENT 25 (2012) (“The
favorable sentence that eluded the defendant in the criminal proceeding appears
to be the sentence he or others in his position would have received in the
ordinary course . . . .”); Roberts, supra note 90 (manuscript at 10) (observing
that a defendant may now show prejudice by demonstrating that “it was
reasonably likely that [a sentencing consequence] could have been avoided
through ‘creative bargaining’”).
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convicted defendant is prejudiced by the very trial sentence that
the code law prescribed (or even mandated).112 Thus, the Court
concluded, “a reliable trial” is an “insufficient . . . backstop t[o]
inoculate[] any errors” of bargaining counsel.113 The defendant
was compelled to risk a trial when an (obviously better) plea
course was available, and he thereby missed out—or, to put it in
the Court’s terms, suffered a “loss of the plea opportunity” to
plead guilty on better terms.114
Moreover a lost opportunity to plead guilty is not suffered
exclusively by the innocent defendant. (Indeed, one would hope
that innocent defendants rarely plead guilty, even if that hope is
ultimately unrealistic.)115 Accordingly, the Court observed that
the bargaining right to counsel is guaranteed equally to “the
innocent and the guilty alike.”116 Significantly, then, the Court’s
presumption of guilt and its attendant indifference to legal
accuracy have served to produce an all-inclusive right to counsel.
Comparatively, in Strickland v. Washington,117 the Court
provided that “the defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.”118
In the trial context, this standard means that the defendant must
demonstrate that the absence of competent counsel “undermined
confidence” in the guilt accuracy of the jury’s verdict.119 Again,
the right to trial counsel remains accuracy-oriented: it is
concerned primarily with ensuring that the defendant retains the
capacity to exercise legal rights against coercion, at least in
advance of an accurate judicial adjudication that the exercise of
state power is appropriate. By contrast, the right to bargaining
112. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1387.
115. See generally Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
1117 (2008) [hereinafter Bowers, Punishing the Innocent].
116. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388 (“[W]e decline to hold either that the guarantee
of effective assistance of counsel belongs solely to the innocent or that it
attaches only to matters affecting the determination of actual guilt.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
117. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
118. Id. at 694.
119. Id.
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counsel is fairness-oriented: it is concerned primarily with
ensuring that the defendant retains the capacity to succumb to
state power on the best available terms. Thus, a manifestly guilty
defendant is better protected at bargain than at trial because, to
show prejudice, he need establish only a reasonable probability
that counsel’s errors stood in his way of receiving a better plea.
Put differently, only the bargaining right to counsel is designed to
accommodate relative differences in sentence length across guilty
defendants.
There is nothing all that new to the notion that the Court
sometimes has regulated pleas more aggressively (or, at least,
more inclusively) than trials. Such a counterintuitive result may
be traced to the prevailing methodological divide between
fairness and accuracy. Consider, for example, the early pleabargaining case, Santobello v. New York.120 The Court held that a
prosecutor had violated due process by failing to fulfill a plea
promise to make no sentencing recommendation.121 Significantly,
the Court assumed that the prosecutor breached the agreement
inadvertently and that the judge was unaffected by the
prosecutor’s recommendation in any event. Nevertheless, the
Court provided a constitutional remedy.122 The touchstone was
procedural unfairness, not substantive inaccuracy.
To the contrary, the Court has taken a dimmer view of trial
unfairness in circumstances in which the procedure in question
left guilt accuracy unaffected. So, for instance, in Darden v.
Wainwright,123 the Court refused to hold that the prosecutor had
violated due process with an inflammatory closing argument
that, according to the Court, “should make conscientious
prosecutors cringe.”124 Specifically, the prosecutor ranted that the
defendant was an “animal” who should be kept on a “leash” with
120. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
121. See id. at 262 (“[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a
promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the
inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.”).
122. See id. at 262–63 (“[W]e conclude that the interests of justice and
appropriate recognition of the duties of the prosecution in relation to promises
made in the negotiation of pleas of guilty will be best served by remanding the
case to the state courts for further consideration.”).
123. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986).
124. Id. at 189 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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his face “blown . . . off.”125 Nevertheless, because the comments
did not affect the outcome of the trial—that is, because they did
not implicate guilt accuracy—the Court concluded that they were
beyond the reach of constitutional law.126 Comparing Santobello
and Darden, we learn that the Court may be willing to
constitutionally regulate sloppy and unprofessional prosecutorial
efforts at plea that it is unwilling to regulate at trial. Likewise,
comparing Lafler and Strickland, we learn that the Court may be
willing to constitutionally regulate defense errors at plea that it
is unwilling to regulate at trial.
Justice Marshall has earned the posthumous last laugh. In
his Strickland dissent, Justice Marshall faulted the Court for
prioritizing trial accuracy to fairness: “[T]he assumption on which
the Court’s holding rests is that the only purpose of the
constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel is to
reduce the chance that innocent persons will be convicted.”127
Now, Justice Scalia has faulted the Court for prioritizing
bargaining fairness to accuracy:
Anthony Cooper received a full and fair trial, was found guilty
of all charges by a unanimous jury, and was given the
sentence that the law prescribed. . . . [E]ven though there is no
doubt that the respondent here is guilty of the offense with
which he was charged; even though he has received the
exorbitant gold standard of American justice—a full-dress
criminal trial[;] . . . the Court says that his conviction is
invalid because he was deprived of his constitutional
entitlement to plea-bargain. I am less saddened by the outcome
of this case than I am by what it says about this Court’s
attitude toward criminal justice.128

125. Id. at 192 (quoting prosecutor: “I wish I could see him sitting here with
no face, blown away by a shotgun”).
126. Id.
127. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 711 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that “[e]very defendant”—even the “manifestly” guilty
defendant—“is entitled to a trial in which his interests are vigorously and
conscientiously advocated by an able lawyer”).
128. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1392, 1397–98 (2012) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see also Stephanos Bibas, Taming Negotiated Justice, 122 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 35, 36 (2012) (“[The] flaw in Justice Scalia’s dissent is his assumption
that nothing matters except for factual guilt.”).
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Justice Scalia is saddened by the Court’s recognition that trial
and bargaining counsel operate on different planes, and that the
measure of effective assistance of bargaining counsel is not
reducible to some easy legalistic measure of guilty accuracy. For a
proponent of “the rule of law as a law of rules,”129 this may be a
hard pill to swallow, but that makes it no less true.
Finally, by promoting awareness of all (or, at least, many) of
the relevant external facts—and not just of the relevant
procedural and substantive law—the Court also may have
indirectly mitigated the harshness of consequent guilty pleas.
After all, full information—about, for instance, the availability
and merits of an offer—maximizes the defendant’s opportunities
to shortcut creatively the substantive unfairness of legally
supported criminal charges.
It is my position that tools ought to exist to circumvent law.
Remarkably, the Court now apparently shares that extralegal
position.130 Thus, it is the local conception of “the sound
administration of criminal justice” that matters to the
effectiveness inquiry far more than centralized legislative
command. And it is the lost opportunity to bargain creatively that
matters far more than the “full-dress criminal trial,”131 for the
trial is concerned with the law as it is, whereas the bargain—
consistent with contract principles—is concerned principally with
the law as the parties make it.
VII. The Implications of the Emergence of Professional Persuasion
By establishing a constitutional right to bargain, the Court
arguably has opened the door to a requirement that a defense
129. Antonin Scalia, The Rule as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1175 (1989).
130. Perhaps it is unsurprising that Justice Kennedy wrote Padilla, Lafler,
and Frye. Among the Justices, Kennedy has shown himself to be particularly
sympathetic to equitable circumvention of substantive law. Anthony M.
Kennedy, Keynote Speech at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting
(Aug. 9, 2003), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeeches.
aspx?Filename=sp_08-09-03.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (urging the ABA to
“consider a recommendation to reinvigorate the pardon process”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
131. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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attorney not only inform a client of the law and facts of the case,
but also that she exercise legal and extralegal persuasion.132
Persuasion, in this context, may operate in either of two
directions: the defense attorney may be obliged to exercise what
Tony Amsterdam has called “considerable persuasion” (1) to
convince the prosecutor to offer a defendant-favorable plea,
and/or (2) to convince the defendant to accept that offer.133
Questions remain about the direction and degree to which
the Court has obliged the defense attorney to bargain.134 Because
the Lafler Court did not reach the performance prong of the
ineffectiveness test, it never determined whether the defense
attorney erred constitutionally by misadvising the client to reject
the plea. But, again, the Court’s willingness to recraft prejudice
indicates that it, too, agreed with the parties that the attorney’s
performance was deficient. However, it still remains unclear
whether the mistake at issue amounted to an erroneous reading
132. See id. at 1376, 1384 (majority opinion) (“During plea negotiations
defendants are entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel.”
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); cf. Hawkman v. Parratt, 661
F.2d 1161, 1171 (8th Cir. 1981) (“[W]e do not hold that defense counsel always
has a duty to initiate plea bargaining negotiations. The legal inquiry into
whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance necessarily encompasses
consideration of many relevant factors.”); Jane Campbell Moriarty & Marisa
Main, “Waiving” Goodbye to Rights: Plea Bargaining and the Defense Dilemma
of Competent Representation, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1029, 1052 (2011)
(observing pre-Cooper and Frye that a “criminal defense attorney. . . may even
have a duty to seek out plea negotiations with the prosecution”).
133. ANTHONY AMSTERDAM, 1 TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL
CASES 5, § 201 (5th ed. 1988) (“[O]ften counsel can protect the client from
disaster only by using a considerable amount of persuasion to convince the
client.”); see also AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION
FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-5.1 (3d ed. 1993) (“Once the lawyer has
concluded that it is in the best interests of the accused to enter a guilty plea, it
is proper for the lawyer to use reasonable persuasion to guide the client to a
sound decision.”); Steve Zeidman, To Plead or Not to Plead: Effective Assistance
& Client-Centered Counseling, 39 B.C. L. REV. 841, 895–907 (1998) (discussing
counsel’s emerging obligation—ethically and legally—to engage in reasonable
persuasion); Bowers, Winning by Losing, supra note 19, at 127 (discussing
counsel’s obligation to exercise “reasonable persuasion”).
134. Cf. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1412–13 (2012) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“[D]oes a hard-bargaining ‘personal-style’ now violate the Sixth
Amendment? The Court ignores such difficulties. . . . It will not do simply to
announce that they will be solved in the sweet by-and-by.”).
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of the substantive law, an erroneous prediction of juror behavior,
an erroneous appraisal of the value of the plea, or an erroneous
forecast of the probability of a better plea. Likely, the lawyer
made some amalgam of errors. And that is just the point: an
attorney’s bargaining mistakes do not always segregate cleanly
into legal and extralegal categories. And, to the extent the
defense attorney’s mistakes consisted of a practice error about the
wisdom of the plea offer, it may follow that defense attorneys are
now obliged to exercise sufficient persuasion to ensure that, in
practice, their clients get and take good deals.135
Moreover, I am not alone in reading Lafler and Frye to
potentially obligate the defense attorney to exercise some amount
of persuasion. According to Jenny Roberts, one of the contributors
to this volume:
The majority could have drawn a constitutional line between
the defense counsel–client conversation and the defense
counsel–prosecutor conversation, declining to regulate the
latter. Instead, the Court’s recent plea jurisprudence is firmly
grounded in the “reality” of the central role plea bargaining
plays in the criminal justice system. . . . [I]f the prosecutor
does not, must defense counsel take steps to explore the
alternatives? It is difficult to conceive of counsel’s role,
particularly in a system where so many cases are resolved
through bargaining, that does not include such a duty.136

The Court’s unmistakable tenor is that the defense attorney is
now compelled to bargain aggressively, and the Court is
committed to aggressively regulating counsel’s efforts.
Aggressive constitutional regulation of this kind, however, is
not without paradox. First, aggressive regulation fosters a more
efficient market, which in turn, may serve to generate still more
pleas.137 The Court has improved not only the quality of defense
135. Indeed, this is what the Second Circuit previously held in Boria v.
Keane—a case that, until Lafler, had appeared to be little more than an outlier.
Boria v. Keane, 99 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 1996). Specifically, in Boria, the court held
that the defendant had established ineffective assistance of bargaining counsel
when his attorney failed to push him to take a manifestly favorable plea to avoid
a “suicidal” trial. Id. at 497.
136. Roberts, supra note 90 (manuscript at 11).
137. See Bowers, Winning by Losing, supra note 19, at 126 (“[A]
constitutionally regulated market is predictable and user-friendly . . . . In this
vein, even decisions that have limited prosecutorial bargaining authority . . .
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counsel, but also the prosecutor’s capacity to send a clear signal
that the failure to plead guilty is likely to be “suicidal.”138 That is,
the more effective the bargaining defense attorney, the more
keenly aware the defendant is made of the coercive power of the
State. The defense lawyer may even become something of a
conscripted agent, enlisted into the prosecutor’s efforts to push
the defendant to plea.139 Indeed, it would seem doubtful that this
reality was lost on the Court. Rather, much of the Court’s pleabargaining jurisprudence appears to be animated by the fear that
a defendant who considers a plea procedure unfair is likelier to
gum up the system by taking his case to trial.140 By contrast, a
defendant who considers trial procedures unfair is likelier to opt
for an efficient bargain. The Court’s incentive is to regulate the
fairness of bargaining and plea procedures more aggressively
than trial procedures.
Ultimately, then, there exists a complicated interplay
between plea-bargaining and coercion—narrowly, between pleabargaining and draconian substantive criminal codes. By
compelling the defense attorney to bargain hard around unfair
code law (and to exercise “considerable persuasion” in her
dealings with both the State and her client), the Court has
facilitated the substantive circumvention of law in the name of
procedural fairness. But substantive and procedural fairness can
be achieved only when and if the prosecutor is willing to bargain
(and only when and if the defendant is willing to pay for
substantive and procedural fairness by sacrificing trial rights).141
Simply, the defendant still lacks the capacity to challenge
constitutionally the substantive fairness of the underlying
coercive charge. He possesses only the procedural right to a
have reinforced the plea bargaining regime and thereby promoted the
government’s interest in expeditious case processing.”).
138. Boria, 99 F.3d at 497.
139. See Bowers, Winning by Losing, supra note 19, at 126–27 (discussing
the effects of “conscripted counsel”).
140. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) (describing
the benefits of requiring fair plea procedures because pleas are “highly
desirable . . . for many reasons”).
141. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385, 1387 (2012) (observing that
“[i]f no plea offer is made, . . . the issue [of bargaining ineffectiveness] . . . simply
does not arise”).
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competent lawyer who is compelled to do what she can do to get
the defendant out from under that unfair charge.
Second, the Court has not only subjected professional
practice to constitutional oversight, it has entrenched more
deeply the professionalization of practice. That is, only
professionals may take account of extralegal fairness
considerations, notwithstanding the fact that, as I have argued
many times before, laypeople are probably better equipped to
reach some kinds of normative judgments.142 Of course,
professionals are experts in the art of practice, but laypeople are
experts in the art of moral reasoning, and both skills are relevant
to the question of what constitutes a fair and appropriate plea
deal. Yet, Padilla, Lafler, and Frye have served to marginalize
further from the criminal justice system the already quitemarginal layperson because, ultimately, such decisions make the
measure of fairness not a moral measure but a measure of
prevailing courthouse practice. Extralegal business is a
professional business that remains none of a layperson’s
business.143
Notwithstanding the differences between trial and
bargaining practice, the two are similar in one significant way:
each fails to take full or effective advantage of lay participation.
That is, in both contexts, laypeople are prohibited de jure from
doing what they do best—practicing equitable discretion. A trial
juror retains only the power to nullify, but not the right (meaning
that an exercise of nullification is impermissible but that there is

142. See Josh Bowers, The Normative Case for Normative Grand Juries, 47
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 319, 332 (2012) (“[M]oral questions are eminently
accessible to the layperson and distinctly within her capacity.”); Josh Bowers,
Mandatory Life and the Death of Equitable Discretion 20 (Va. Law Public Law
and Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 2011-12) (“There are plausible
reasons to believe that lay bodies contextualize the retributive inquiry better
than legal technicians.”); Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and
the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1723 (2010)
(“Law enforcement and adjudication are intended to be equitably individualized,
but . . . professional functionaries . . . act according to idiosyncratic rules, norms,
preferences, and biases.”).
143. Cf. Bibas, Taming Negotiated Justice, supra note 128, at 37 (discussing
the anemic moral roles of jurors in contemporary plea-bargaining and the
criminal justice system, more generally).
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no remedy for it).144 More to the point, a defense attorney is
prohibited from urging a trial jury to nullify.145 Ironically,
however, post-Lafler, a defense attorney is not just permitted but
perhaps obligated to make these very same extralegal arguments
to the prosecutor at the bargaining stage. That is, the defense
attorney may be compelled to press for an equitable (and
extralegal) exception from otherwise applicable code law.
To a degree, this is as it should be. Trials are (and should be)
comparatively more structured than the less formal and more
discretionary domains of charging, bargaining, and sentencing.
The domain of trial is—and ought to remain—a domain of
predefined law. At the trial, legal accuracy is the appropriate and
central question, and, therefore, it ought to play a more
significant role than extralegal persuasion. Nevertheless, I am on
record in support of reforms intended to involve lay decisionmakers (at least somewhat) in the extralegal—or discretionary—
domains of criminal procedure (like charging and potentially also
bargaining and sentencing).146 Of course, a layperson lacks the
practice wisdom to comprehend effectively the intricacies, norms,
and customs of the local courthouse, but she has practical
wisdom. By contrast, the professional is likelier to lack the will or
capacity to consistently act upon practical wisdom, because she
operates under institutional and cognitive biases distinct to her
role.147 An optimal institutional design would incorporate both lay
144. See Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV.
253, 283 (1996) (“The Supreme Court has also been surprisingly quiet about the
right to nullify, but when it did speak, it severely undercut the claim that the
doctrine is constitutionally protected.”).
145. See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895) (“[I]t cannot be
regarded as the right of counsel to dispute before the jury the law as declared by
the court.”); Scarpa v. Dubois, 38 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1994) (“[D]efense counsel
may not press arguments for jury nullification in criminal cases.”); United
States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1189–90 (1st Cir. 1993) (observing that the
trial judge “may block defense attorneys’ attempts to serenade a jury with the
siren song of nullification”).
146. See supra note 142 (citing sources).
147. See Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable
Decision Not to Prosecute, supra note 142, at 1690 (“Legal proficiency, therefore,
comes at a cost of some loss of practical wisdom, or, at least, some loss of
capacity to freely exercise it. Conversely, a one-off lay perspective entails a
‘simple ordinariness’ that may prove superior to professional perspective in
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and professional insights. It would ensure that laypeople and
professionals work together—sharing power—in order to tap
effectively the respective wisdom of each. In the right-to-counsel
context, such power sharing may be of particular value: a
criminal defendant needs more than the practical and legal
expertise of the professional; he needs also the moral reasoning of
the layperson.
Ironically, the practice of nullification was borne of a deep lay
“distrust of legal professionals” and a corresponding preference
for “natural justice” over “black-letter law.”148 In the
contemporary criminal justice system, however, substantive
equitable discretion is the dominion of these very same
professionals who control the practice of plea-bargaining (which
is the prevailing outlet for equitable expression in contemporary
criminal justice). Decisions like Padilla, Lafler, and Frye—and,
for that matter, Santobello, Bordenkircher, and Brady—do little
more than ensure that such professional practice is
constitutionally well-regulated. Nevertheless, an efficient and
professional circumvention market may be a passable alternative
to better options that the Court may be wholly unwilling to
pursue: aggressive substantive constitutional regulation or
meaningful lay involvement in equitable decision-making. That
is, the Court’s approach may constitute the pragmatic (and even
normatively compelled) best course for a pathological system of
criminal justice that depends not only on procedural horse
trading, but also substantive mandatory sentencing statutes that
ill serve any sound conception of proportionality or crime control.
If we lack the political or judicial will to reign in runaway
substantive criminal codes, we may depend upon second-order
tools to mitigate some of the most deleterious effects. One such
tool is the provision of a defense lawyer who is sometimes obliged
constitutionally to push hard to convince prosecutors not to follow
the law.
Prosecutors rely on tough statutes for plea-bargaining
leverage. (Indeed, the Frye Court acknowledged that many
“longer sentences exist on the books largely for bargaining
equitable contexts.”).
148. Steven M. Warshawsky, Opposing Jury Nullification: Law, Policy, and
Prosecutorial Strategy, 85 GEO. L.J. 191, 199 (1996).
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purposes.”)149 And, thus, tough statutes promote plea-bargaining.
At the same time, bargaining also often provides the only way
out. In this way, cases like Padilla, Lafler, and Frye reflect
concurrently the triumph of plea-bargaining and the frank
understanding that what lawyers do without law is sometimes
more important than what they do within it.
VIII. Conclusion
The practice of plea-bargaining and the constitutional right
(or rights) to counsel always have had a complicated relationship.
On the one hand, Gideon and its progeny have made criminal
process more costly and thereby have compelled greater reliance
on plea-bargains and guilty pleas. The Court even has used the
presence of counsel as a ground to legitimate constitutionally the
practice of plea-bargaining. Consider, for instance, the Brady
Court’s efforts to distinguish permissible bargaining pressure
from the involuntary confession “obtained by any direct or
implied promises, however slight.”150 For the Court, the presence
of counsel was key:
[W]ith a confession given by a defendant in custody, alone and
unrepresented by counsel . . . , even a mild promise of leniency
was deemed sufficient to bar the confession, not because the
promise was an illegal act as such, but because defendants at
such times are too sensitive to inducement and the possible
impact on them too great to ignore and too difficult to assess. . . .
[The confession] situation bears no resemblance to [pleabargaining] . . . . [The pleading defendant] had competent
counsel and full opportunity to assess the advantages and
disadvantages of a trial as compared with those attending a
plea of guilty; there was no hazard of an impulsive and
improvident response to a seeming but unreal advantage.151

Finally, the presence of counsel may generate more guilty pleas,
precisely because defense lawyers are persuasive. Bad agents

149. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012).
150. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970) (quoting Bram v.
United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542–43 (1897)).
151. Id. at 754.
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may push clients to plead guilty to minimize workload.152 Good
agents may push clients to plead guilty to avoid trial disasters.153
On the other hand, the practice of plea-bargaining has
compelled the Court to take a hard and clear-eyed constitutional
look at real-world practice. The Court has come to understand
that competent counsel demands more than just attention to law
and that the judiciary, in turn, cannot regulate adequately
defense lawyers without also regulating the extralegal aspects of
their practice.
Consider how far the system has come. At common law, the
defense attorney was limited typically to legal arguments. As one
eighteenth century trial judge explained the rule to a defendant
at the Old Bailey: “Your counsel is not at liberty to state any
matter of fact . . . . [T]hey are here to speak to any matters of law
that may arise; but if your defense arises out of a matter of fact,
you must yourself state it to me and the jury.”154 It is now well
established that defense counsel is equipped to do much more
than speak to matters of law. They may speak to facts that
support legal defenses at trial and also to facts that support legal
and extralegal mitigation at bargain and plea.
By now, the Court has progressed far along the path toward
finishing what it started in Brady and Santobello. The Court has
made one domain beyond formal law—that is, plea-bargaining—a
domain of unique constitutional control. This is a right and
proper approach, because plea-bargaining, ultimately, is a
domain that is unique. It is a domain that has less to do with
legal guilt and “testing the prosecution’s case.” It is a domain that
has much more to do with understanding comparative costs. It is
a domain where the good lawyer strikes favorable deals and the
bad lawyer pushes her clients in the direction of disadvantageous
152. Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, supra note 115, at 1151 (“[T]he lazy
lawyer has an increased incentive to diligently pursue plea negotiations,
because . . . [it] maximizes chances that the lawyer will not have to invest
heavily in repeat appearances, or, worse still, trial work.”).
153. See Bowers, Winning by Losing, supra note 19, at 126 (“[I]f a prosecutor
makes an offer that is too good to refuse, the defense attorney must not only
inform the defendant of the offer but perhaps also take steps to persuade the
defendant to accept.”).
154. Langbein, supra note 40, at 1054 (quoting Russen, OBSP (Oct. 1777), at
374).
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deals or, worse, procedurally fair but eminently bleak trials. It is
a domain where the right to extralegal counsel may cash out as
little more than a substantive transfer of bargaining power from
the prosecutor to the defendant. But, within that domain, the
ability to extract cheaper pleas amounts to a constructive reform.
It serves as a welcome counterweight to prosecutors’ almost
unfettered charging discretion to set starting prices so very high.

